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RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?: WHAT THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT CAN AND
SHOULD SAY ABOUT FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Abstract: Despite the popular belief that all U.S. citizens should have a
voice in government, many states continue to have felony disenfran-
chisement. laws depriving felons of their voting rights in some fashion.
There is, furthermore, sufficient evidence that such felony disenfran-
chisement laws have a greater effect on minorities than on others. As
such, some litigants have turned to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
is aimed at eliminating racially discriminatory voting regulations and
practices, as a means of overturning felony disenfranchisement taws.
This Note examines the current caselaw surrounding the application of
the Voting Rights Act to state felony disenfranchisement statutes. In ana-
lyzing the caselaw, this Note attempts to explain the shortcomings of
this strategy. Lastly, this Note suggests that future litigants should under-
take an approach based on the Fourteenth Amendment's constitutional
guarantee of an individual's right to vote.
INTRODUCTION
Since the Civil War, Constitutional emendation, judicial deci-
sions, and congressional action have commingled in the area of vot-
ing rights jurisprudence to reflect a federal commitment to expand
voting rights and electoral opportunity. 1 The cumulative effect of this
activity has restricted, if not outright eviscerated, states' authority to
regulate their citizens' franchise rights. 2 As it currently stands, nearly
every state regulation that limits citizen access to polls is subject to
I See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (extending suffrage rights to all races); id. amend. XVII
(permitting direct election of senators); id. amend. XIX (extending franchise to women);
id. amend. XXIII (permitting District of Columbia residents to vote for presidential elec-
tom); id. amend. XXIV (prohibiting federal poll taxes); id. amend. XXVI (lowering voting
age to eighteen); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 197361)-1 (2000)
(safeguarding voting rights against discrimination); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555
(1964) (finding the right to vote protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Peter Shane, Disappearing Democraty: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal
Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 535, 548-49 (2001) (discussing the
progressive trajectory towards a more expansive democracy).
2 See Dunn v. Blunistein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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strict scrutiny, meaning the restriction must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling state interest, 3
 This standard has proven to be
so rigorous that it compelled Chief Justice Burger to predict that no
state could ever meet it, for "it demands nothing less than perfec-
tion. "4
In light of this trend toward limiting state power to set voter quali-
fications, the practice of felony disenfranchisement stands as a demon-
strable outlier:3
 Felony disenfranchisement—the practice of disqualify-
ing those convicted of felonies from participating in elections—
remains a prevalent state practice. 6
 Forty-eight states disenfranchise
criminals in one form or another.? Felony disenfranchisement statutes
disfranchise more citizens than any other election procedure currently
in use by states. 8
 In 2004, over five million citizens could not vote be-
cause of their state's felony disenfranchisement policy. 9
 Although the
Supreme Court recognized the right to vote as a fundamental and con-
stitutional right, overturning longstanding and traditional state election
practices, such as poll taxes and durational residency requirements,
felony disenfranchisement statutes have evaded the probing suspicion
of strict scrutiny." Attempts to challenge state criminal disenfranchise-
ment statutes on constitutional grounds have proven largely unsuccess-
ful. 11
 Accordingly, disenfranchising felons remains within the purview
of the states." In many respects, the practice constitutes the sole re-
maining vestige of states' power to disfranchise their citizens."
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 ("[S] ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scruti-
nized.").
4 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 363-64 (1972) (Burger, CI, dissenting).
5 Compare Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (asserting state authority to
disenfranchise felons as a class of citizens), with Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (denying state
authority to establish malapportioned districts).
6
 See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons: One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felony
Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1939-49 (2002) [hereinafter One Person, No
Vote].
7 See id. at 1942.
See Angela Behrens, Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 231 (2004).
9 See id.
1 ° See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
" See, e.g., id.; Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998); One Person, No Vote,
.supra note 6, at 1949-52 (listing unsuccessful constitutional challenges to felony disenfran-
chisement).
17
 One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1939-58.
IS See Behrens, supra note 8, at 231.
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Furthermore, many states actively exercise this power, disenfran-
chising many citizens. The outcome-determinative effect that Florida's
felony disenfranchisement laws, for example, had on the 2000 presi-
dential election prompted a spate of scholarship on the practice."
Scholars and commentators have criticized the practice of disfranchis-
ing felons on the grounds that it stigmatizes criminals, fosters social
withdrawal, and impedes rehabilitation efforts.' 5 Others have mounted
class-based arguments against the practice, noting the disparate impact
that felony disenfranchisement laws have on minority communities. 16
In addition to increased scholarship, litigants have renewed their
focus on challenging disenfranchisement laws in the courts. 17 In re-
cent years, litigants have moved away from constitutional challenges—
effectively foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent—and looked to the
Voting Rights Act (the "VRA" or "Act") as a means to overturn state
criminal disenfranchisement laws. 18 As amended in 1982, the VRA pro-
hibits voting restrictions that have a racially discriminatory impact, dif-
fering from the earlier version of the Act which prohibited only voting
restrictions enacted with discriminatory intent. 19 Litigants contend that
the current VRA renders felony disenfranchisement statutes, which
undeniably effect racial minorities disproportionately, invalid."
14 See, e.g., Angela Behrens & Christopher Uggen, Ballot Manipulation and the "Menace of
Negro Domination'': Racial Threat and Felony Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2002,
109 AM. J. Soc. 559, 597 (2003); Alec Ewald, Civil Death: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1072; George P.
Fletcher, Disenfranchisement As Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of I niatnia, 46 UCLA
L. REv. 1895, 1896-1904 (1998); Pamela Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Repre-
sentation and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. lbw. 1147, 1155 (2004);
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Felon Disenfranchisement and Ameri-
can Democracy, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 777, 778-94 (2002); Behrens, supra note 8, at 231; Elena
Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons' Challenges to Disenfranchise-
ment and Employment Discrimination, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1624-27 (2004); JAmIE FELLNER
& MARC MAUF.R, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN
THE UNFrEU STATES (1998), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9080.pclf.
15 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 14, at 1166; FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 14, at 16.
16 See Behrens & Uggen, supra note 14, at 596-99.
17 See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1230-33 (11th Cir. 2005) (en
banc); Munt2gint v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115-30 (2c1 Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978, rell'g
en bane granted, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004); Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan ), 338
F.3d 1009, 1014-23 (9th Cir. 2003).
18 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228-33; Murztagim, 366 F.3d at 115-30; Farrakhan II, 338
F.3d at 1014-23.
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 27-43 (1982), as reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 204-21.
20 See, e.g., Muntaqim, 366 F.3(1 at 103-05; Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
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Federal circuits have split on the question of whether the VRA
presents an appropriate or allowable vehicle to challenge felony dis-
enfranchisement laws." In particular, the circuits disagree as to 1)
whether Congress sufficiently indicated its intent for the VRA to reach
felony disenfranchisement laws and 2) presuming the VRA can reach
felony disenfranchisement laws, whether such an application would
render the Act out of congruence and proportion to the injury it
seeks to redress, and therefore unconstitutional.22 In short, the dis-
agreement among the circuits concerns the intended scope of the
VRA and the permissible parameters of Congress's enforcement
authority. 25
 This Note assesses the sources and reasoning behind the
circuit split, specifically examining whether applying the VRA to fel-
ony disenfranchisement statutes requires a plain congressional state-
ment and whether such an application of the VRA exceeds Congress's
enforcement powers. 24
Part I of this Note briefly traces the history of federal encroach-
ment on the traditional state practice of defining electoral qualifica-
tions, noting in particular the judicial trend in voting rights cases to-
ward granting constitutional protection to individuals' franchise
rights.25 Part H of this Note juxtaposes the seminal Supreme Court de-
cisions governing the constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement
against the backdrop of these traditional voting rights cases, observing
the heightened presumption of constitutionality felony disenfran-
chisement statutes receive, in contrast to almost all other state disen-
franchisement laws. 26 Part II also explores the current prevalence and
impact of state felony disenfranchisement laws and reviews some of the
current policy debates concerning the practice." Part III of this Note
turns to the current litigation strategy of challenging state felony disen-
franchisement statutes under the VRA, and introduces the tensions that
have arisen between the circuits, describing in detail the different ap-
21 See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 130; Farrakhan 14 338 F.3d at 1016. See generally Lauren
Handelsman, Note, Giving the Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement Under
the Voting Rights Act of 1965,7 FORDHAM L. lbw. 1875 (2005).
22
 See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 130; Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1012-14.
25 Compare Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 115-30 (holding that the VRA cannot constitutionally
invalidate state criminal disenfranchisement laws), with Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016
(finding that the VRA can invalidate state criminal disenfranchisement laws).
21 See infra notes 195-359 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 89-111 and accompanying text.
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proaches taken in the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals.28
Part IV of this Note critically assesses both sources of the circuit
split. 29
 It argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly disregarded the plain
statement rule in applying the VRA to felony disenfranchisement stat-
utes." Indeed, the VRA does not alter the federal-state balance because
the voting rights jurisprudence has charted a clear course away from
state authority. 31
 Furthermore, the VRA contains no ambiguity about its
scope, so to the extent that the plain statement rule applies, Congress
expressed its clear intent to invalidate all discriminatory voting prac-
tices, including felony disenfranchisement laws. 32 Part IV agrees with
the Second and Eleventh Circuits—albeit for different reasons and with
some reservations—that permitting the VRA to reach felony disenfran-
chisement would necessitate a presumption of congressional authority
in excess of its enforcement power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 33 To extend the VRA to invalidate criminal disenfran-
chisement statutes would exceed congressional power and therefore
render the Act constitutionally suspect. 34
 The Note concludes by sug-
gesting that litigants seeking to challenge state criminal disenfran-
chisement laws explore alternative constitutional challenges,"
I. THE FUNDAMENTALITY OF VOTING RIGHTS
A. Traditional Voting Rights Cases
As originally drafted, the U.S. Constitution grants states near-
plenary power to restrict and regulate the franchise rights of their
citizens.36
 On the basis of this broad grant of authority, much of U.S.
history has seen and accepted pronounced restrictions on poll access.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and for much
of the twentieth, states regularly conditioned voting rights upon race,
sex, taxpayer status, or property ownership, to name just a few. 37
28 See infra notes 112-279 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 280-359 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 318-59 and accompanying text.
34
 See infra notes 318-59 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
S°SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
37 See Pamela Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U.
CM. L. REv. 1345,1346-62 (2003).
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The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments (the
"Franchise Amendments") reign in states' authority to regulate fran-
chise rights." The Franchise Amendments prohibit states from dis-
criminating at the polls on the basis of race, sex, or minority status."
These limitations, however, extend only to purposefully discriminatory
practices, and on their own, do not significantly curb states' broad
authority to restrict who can vote in elections.0
 The Franchise
Amendments themselves are powerless to confront more subtle forms
of discrimination, such as facially neutral voting requirements like poll
taxes or literacy tests that in practice exclude a disproportionate per-
centage of minority or women voters. 41
 Thus, prior to the 1960s, states
retained their near-plenary authority to grant or restrict their citizen's
right to vote, so long as the states did not act with discriminatory in-
ten t .42
A series of Warren Court decisions in the 1960s eviscerated that
near-plenary authority and substantially curbed states' power to regu-
late franchise.43 In 1962, in Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that a malapportioned districting plan that diluted the voting
strength of individuals in overpopulated districts presented a chal-
lengeable offense under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause." Baker touched off a string of cases, the cumulative effect
of which created the one-person, one-vote constitutional principle. 45
Although the Franchise Amendments shield classes of voters from
discrimination, these Warren-era precedents embed the right to vote
in modern conceptions of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment
and afford constitutional protection to an individual's right to "par-
ticipate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the juris-
3E' See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXV.
33
 See id. amend. XV; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXV.
4° See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959) (up-
holding the constitutionality of a state literacy test as a prerequisite for voting).
41 See id. (recognizing the potential for literacy tests to interact with racial segregation
in schools to dilute minority voting strength, but finding no constitutional violation); see
also Breedlove v. Settles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (sustaining the constitutionality of poll
taxes).
See Lassiter; 360 U.S. at 50-51; Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283.
43 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (overturning durational resi-
dency requirements); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (overturning disparately
apportioned redistricting plan); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964) (overturn-
ing a Georgia apportionment scheme); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (finding a
state's apportionment scheme subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny).
H 369 U.S. at 236.
45 See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
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diction."4& Free elections and, correspondingly, the right to partici-
pate in free elections allow American citizens to authorize their gov-
ernmental agents to enact laws that affect their liberties, and are thus
too precious to be subject to interference. 47
 The legacy of these cases
posits an individual's access to the polls not as a privilege conferred by
the state, but as a fundamental federal right guaranteed by the Consti-
tution's Fourteenth Amendment." Any state regulation that infringes
on that fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny and will only pass
constitutional muster if it is narrowly tailored to promote a compel-
ling state interest." By grounding voting rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court armed litigants seeking access to polls with a
constitutional weapon far more powerful than that offered by the
Franchise Amendments."
An individual-rights based argument grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment not only suffices, but almost always wins.51 Because vot-
ing is a fundamental right, any regulatory deprivation of voting trig-
gers strict scrutiny, the Court's most stringent constitutional protec-
tion and a standard that is nearly impossible to meet.52 Furthermore,
because the right to vote plays such an integral role in preserving all
other constitutional rights, it retains an exalted fundamentality." The
Court's scrutiny of state election practices has been particularly ro-
bust, reaching beyond the state's allocation of voting rights and into
46 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
47 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Distr. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 562.
46 See, e.g., Kramer; 395 U.S. at 626; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
" Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
5° See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 121 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ob-
serving a distinction between the substantive, fundamental right to vote and the right to be
free from discrimination in voting). Compare Harper v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966) (invalidating poll taxes as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment), with
Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283 (upholding poll taxes against a challenge under the Franchise
Amendments).
61
 See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 121; Dunn, 405 U.S. at 363-64 (Burger, CI, dissenting) ("So
far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard
[strict scrutiny), and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection.").5° Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
53 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (extending Equal Protection analysis be-
yond the state's political structures and into the actual administration of the state's voting
standards); see also Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Ha-
sen's and Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 407, 914-17 (2001)
(observing that political equality demanded by the one person, one vote principle has
become an injury in and of itself, not a means to redress a particular injury; and conclud-
ing that voting rights jurisprudence has "become a jurisprudence where the rule is all that
matters").
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the manner of the election. 54
 States must not only permit for equal
access to the polls, but they must also ensure that mechanisms are in
place to accord all votes equal weight and that all voters have equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choosing.55
In short, the Court has recognized a constitutional guarantee of
an individual's voting rights within the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause the right to vote is protective of all other basic political and civil
rights. 56
 Thus, although states may regulate franchise rights, they must
do so narrowly and only to promote a compelling state interest. 57 Very
rarely will states be able to meet that burden; state authority to regu-
late the franchise has become effectively nominal 55
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT
A. Early Supreme Court Cases and Their Legacy
Early challenges to felony disenfranchisement framed the argu-
ment in constitutional terms and aligned the practice of disenfranchis-
ing felons with those practices invalidated under the Warren Court's
progressive recognition of voting as a fundamental right. 59
 The thrust
54 Gore, 531 U.S at 109-05; Richard Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protec-
tion Law in Elections, 29 FL A. ST. U. L. REv. 377, 380-81, 393 (2001) (arguing that Gore sig-
nifies the Court's entry into a "third level of equality—equality in the procedures and
mechanisms used for voting").
55 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
55
 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
57
 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
514 See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 364-65 (Burger, Cj., dissenting) ("So far as I am aware, no
state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard [strict scrutiny], and I
doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection."); see also Gabriel Chin,
Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Re-
peal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 308-09 (2004) ("The modern
Supreme Court pays lip service to the idea that 'the States have the power to impose voter
qualifications.' In practice, however, voter qualifications have been almost wholly federal-
ized."). Many voting restrictions fail the first prong of strict scrutiny because the state in-
terest is not compelling. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). Others present a
compelling state interest, but the state restriction has proven not narrowly enough tailored
to meet it. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343-44 (noting that states have a compelling interest in en-
suring that voters are residents, but finding the added requirement of duration] residency
overbroad). Limiting franchise to those over eighteen, however, is a narrowly tailored
measure to promote a "compelling state interest" because the state has a compelling inter-
est in assuring that voting is used intelligently. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25
(1970). Similarly, a state may have a compelling interest in establishing a bona fide resi-
dency requirement because it ensures that those participating have a vested interest in the
election. See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970).
59 See Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1972).
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of the challenge asserted that felony disenfranchisement impermissibly
impinged on felons' fundamental, constitutional voting rights.° At the
same time, state justifications for the practice were not compelling, nor
were the blanket disenfranchisement regulations sufficiently tailored to
further those ends.° At the lower court level, the claim produced
mixed results, with some courts finding felony disenfranchisement vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause, and others holding that the prac-
tice met the standards of strict scrtltiny.62
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court in Richardson v. Ramirez decided
the issue of felony disenfranchisement wholly apart from considera-
tions of an individual's fundamental right to vote and the state interest
in restricting that right.° Instead, the Court found an affirmative sanc-
tion for the practice within the Fourteenth Amendment's text. 64 Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that any state that de-
nies or abridges the right to vote of any of its male inhabitants twenty-
one years or older shall have its representation in Congress reduced to
reflect the proportion of those who consequently lose their suffrage
rights.65 Section 2, however, exempts from this reduction in appor-
tionment those disenfranChised for "rebellion, or other crime." 66 The
Richardson Court rationalized that the Fourteenth Amendment's first
section must be read in conjunction with its second. 67 The court then
determined that the first section could not ban outright what it "ex-
pressly exempted" from the less severe penalty demanded by the sec-
ond.° Because the "other crime" exception explicitly authorized the
practice, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny. 69
 Thus, states may
constitutionally disenfranchise felons or ex-felons without abridging
their fundamental right to vote, regardless of the state interest impli-
cated."
60 Id.
01 See id.
02
 Compare id. (recognizing the viability of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
Washington's criminal disenfranchisement laws), with Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y, 380
Eal 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967) (denying a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to New
York's criminal disenfranchisement laws).
63
 418 U.S. 24, 54-56 (1974).
64 Id. at 54.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
66 Id.
67 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54-56.
68 Id. at 55.
69 See id. at 54-56.
70 See id. While the Richardson decision found the text of the reduction-in-apportion-
ment clause substantively controlling, it is hard to determine what, if any, value the Four-
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The Richardson holding, however, did not insulate all state laws
depriving felons of their right to vote from constitutional challenge. 71
The Supreme Court imposed an important, though narrow, limitation
on states' ability to restrict criminal voting rights in its 1984 decision
in Hunter v. Underwood. 72 In Underwood, the Court held that an Ala-
bama statute excluding from franchise all felons convicted of crimes
of "moral turpitude" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 73
 The Court found a violation because evidence
demonstrated that the legislature selected which crimes for inclusion
under the umbrella of "moral turpitude" based on its perception of
which crimes African-American would more likely commit. 74 It con-
cluded that the protection of felony disenfranchisement laws found in
Section 2 did not constitutionally immunize statutes passed for the
illegal purpose of discriminating on the basis of race. 75 Put another
way, states may constitutionally disenfranchise felons, but not for an
unconstitutional purpose, such as denying voting rights on the basis
of race or gender.76
teenth Amendment's Section 2 still maintains in voting rights jurisprudence. See Chin,
supra note 58, at 259-60 (noting that "no other provision of the Constitution of 1787 or
any of its amendments has been so comprehensively unenforced"). Courts hearing chal-
lenges under Section 2 have refused to enforce the provision finding either no standing
for suit or that it presents a non-justiciable political question. SeeSharrow v. Brown, 447
F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that the plaintiff had no standing because the injury
alleged was too speculative); Lampkin v. Connor, 360 F.2d 505, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (de-
clining to hear the issue because it presented a political question). Other opinions have
simply disregarded or outright ignored the provision even where it seems patently applica-
ble. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 104 (noting that the Florida state legislature retained the authority
to "take back" the power to appoint Presidential electors even after having granted fran-
chise rights, despite Section 2's express mandate that such disfranchisement be reflected
in the state's apportionment); Shane, supra note 1, at 539-47. Thus, although the
Richardson decision remains good law and continues to control constitutional challenges to
felon disenfranchisement provisions, it proves decidedly anomalous in voting rights juris-
prudence insofar as it gives any credence whatsoever to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Section 2. See Richardson, 418 U.S. 54.
71 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
72 Id. at 231-33.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 227. For example, writing a bad check and petty larceny disqualified citizens
from electoral participation, but second-degree manslaughter and assault on a police offi-
cer did not. Id. at 226-27. Legislative history indicated that these arbitrary distinctions
were intentionally delineated to make black citizens more likely to face disfranchisement.
Id. at 229-33.
73
 Id. at 233.
76
 See Underwood, 471 U.S. at 233.
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The Underwood limitation is exceptionally narrow." Constitu-
tional challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws based on Un-
derwood will only succeed if the plaintiff is able to demonstrate pur-
poseful discrimination in the law's enactment." The plaintiff must
show that the illicit purpose played a substantial role in the passage of
the law." Plaintiffs challenging state laws on an Equal Protection
claim will not meet their burden by demonstrating merely that a law
disparately impacts a particular racial group." Similarly, legislatures
do not offend the Constitution by passing a law known to result in a
discriminatory effect along racial lines so long as the law is passed ac-
cording to racially neutral criteria.81 Only if the legislature continues
the practice because of, not in spite of, the discriminatory result will
any law violate Equal Protection.82
The effect of the Richardson decision, then, post- Underwood, is to
foreclose the individual rights challenge to criminal disenfranchise-
ment statutes." Arguments so imperative to the expansion of franchise
77 See Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan III), 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that Underwood viola-
tions are "exceedingly rare"); Cotton v Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
that even though racial animus motivated Mississippi's criminal disenfranchisement stat-
utes, subsequent emendation mitigated the illicit taint of the original); One Person, No Vote,
supra note 6, at 1951 (noting courts' general reluctance to find Underwood violations).
78 See Farrakhan 111, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en bane) (noting that Underwood violations are "exceedingly rare"); Cotton, 157 F.3c1 at 391;
One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1951 (2002).
SeeArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
8° See id.
81 United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 646 (5th Cir. 1986).
See id.
85 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54; Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing "the right of convicted felons to vote is not 'fundamental'"); Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2cl
391, 395 (4th Cir. 1981) ("The decision in Richardson is generally recognized as having
closed the door on the equal protection argument in a challenge to state statutory voting
disqualifications for conviction of crime ...."). For an argument that the door may remain
open, see Saxonhouse, supra note 14, at 1624-27. Elena Saxonhouse argues that Richardson
merely foreclosed the application of strict scrutiny review to felon disenfranchisement
statutes, but that such statutes are still subject to rational basis review. Id.; see also Karlan,
supra note 14, at 1155 ("[E]ven if criminal disenfranchisement statutes are presumptively
constitutional because of Section 2—as opposed to most other restrictions on the franchise
which are presumptively unconstitutional—their constitutionality is only presumptive: They
still must serve some legitimate purpose and they cannot rest on an impermissible one.")
(emphasis added). If correct, this option should prove an attractive one for litigants dial-
lenging criminal disenfranchisement laws, because the policy justifications for disfranchis-
ing criminals are so tenuous they may fail even rational basis review. See infra notes 121-94
and accompanying text. Courts have generally rejected this argument, however, because
the Richardson opinion seems, though in dicta, to validate the justifications fur criminal
disenfranchisement as reasonable. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53-54 (citing with approval
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tights in the Warren Court—stressing the fundamentality of the indi-
vidual's constitutional right to vote—become moot in the context of
extending the franchise to people convicted of felonies. 84 Because the
Fourteenth Amendment—the very amendment through which indi-
vidual voting rights receive their heightened Constitutional protec-
tion—explicitly authorizes states to exclude criminals from voting, fel-
ons cannot argue that it protects their individual right to vote. 85
 The
consequence of Richardson is not necessarily that the individual rights
argument fails in the context of felony disenfranchisement; it is simply
that there is no individual rights argument to make. 86
 Plaintiffs chal-
lenging the statute can resort only to the class-based challenge of the
pre-Warren era.87
 Thus, only in the "exceedingly rare" instances where
plaintiffs can demonstrate that invidious discrimination played a sub-
stantial factor in the passage of the criminal disenfranchisement law
will they succeed.88
B. The Ubiquity and Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws
Because felony disenfranchisement statutes enjoy Richardson's con-
stitutional shield, their employment by states remains remarkably per-
vasive.89
 Currently, forty-eight states disenfranchise convicted felons in
some manner.99
 Thirty-two states disenfranchise felons for longer than
their period of incarceration. 91
 Eight states permanently disenfranchise
even first-time offenders, pending executive restoration of voting
rights.92
lower court decisions that found criminal disenfranchisement a rational means to further
a legitimate state interest); see also Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986)
(citing Richardson for the proposition that states have a legitimate and compelling justifica-
tion for disfranchising their felons).
84
 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54; Owens, 711 F.2d at 27; Ellisor, 664 F.2d at 395.
85 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54; Owens, 711 F.2d at 27; Ellisor, 664 F.2d at 395.
" See Ewald, supra note 14, at 1072 Mlle textual nature of the Court's decision in
Richardson precluded investigation of principled arguments for and against laws removing
suffrage rights from offenders.").
67 See Underwood, 471 U.S. at 233.
88
 See Farrakhan I//, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
89
 See One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1939-49; FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 14, at
1-4. The prevalence of felony disenfranchisement laws appears to be dwindling, however.
See Karlan, supra note 14, at 1168 (noting a discernible national trend towards restoring
voting rights for ex-felons).
9°
 See One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1942. Maine and Vermont are the exceptions.
Id.
g' Id.
92
 Id. at 1943.
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The impact of these laws is profound and escalating, in large
measure due to the ballooning incarceration and conviction rates. 95
Over five million people in the United States, or two percent of the
electorate, cannot vote because of felony disenfranchisement laws.94
Roughly 1.4 million of those disenfranchised have completed their
sentences, including probation and parole.95
The impact felt by criminal disenfranchisement statutes has a ra-
cial component as well.96
 Over a third of those disenfranchised (an
estimated 1.4 million citizens) are African-American, though African-
Americans comprise just over one-tenth of the national population. 97
Nationally, felony disenfranchisement statutes deprive the right to
vote to thirteen percent of the African American voting population,
seven times the national average.98
 In states that disenfranchise ex-
felons, the effect on minority communities is even more arresting; for
example, Florida and Alabama's disenfranchisement laws deny the
right to vote to one-in-three black rilen.99
The disqualification of such a magnitude of otherwise eligible
voters suggests (and studies confirm) that the practice of disenfran-
chising felons has affected election outcomes.'08
 One study found that
since 1978, seven U.S. Senate elections would have turned out differ-
ently but for the state's criminal disenfranchisement laws.'°' Had fel-
93 See Karlan, supra note 14, at 1156-57 (observing that despite the curtailment of ex-
felon disenfranchisement nationally, due to escalating conviction rates "[t]tle actual im-
pact of felon disenfranchisement is greater than at any point in our history."); see also Be-
hrens, supra note 8, at 231.
"Behrens, supra note 8, at 231.
95 Karlan, supra note 14, at 1157.
FEIINER & MAUER, supra note 14, at 1-2.
97 Karlan, supra note 14, at 1157; FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 14, at 1-2.
98
 Karlan, supra note 1'4, at 1157.
99 FELLNER & MAUER, Supra note 14, at 8.
100
 Uggen & Manza, supra note 14, at 788-92.
101 Id. at 788-89. Christopher Uggen and Jeff Mania conclude that this difference
would likely have shifted the balance of power to the Democrats throughout the 1990s. Id.
at 789-90. Other studies and scholarly work have noted the likelihood that those convicted
of crimes would support the Democratic Party, and the consequent resistance that the
Republican Party would likely exhibit toward any legislative efforts to abolish the practice
of criminal disenfranchisement. See Chin, supra note 58, at 307 ("Republicans have a terri-
ble conflict of interest with respect to African-American voter turnout and its connection
to felon disenfranchisement."); see also Behrens, supra note 8, at 273 n.228 (noting the
political difficulty politicians face in advocating for felon re-enfranchisement). Unsurpris-
ingly, federal legislative efforts to repeal or limit state authority have enjoyed support al-
most exclusively from Democrats. See, e.g„ Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of
2005, H.R. 1300, 109th Cong. (2005); Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong.
(2005); Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 2002, H.R. 5510, 107th Cong. (2002).
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ons been permitted to vote in Florida in 2000, Al Gore would have
carried the state (and thus the Presidency) by at least 40,000 votes."
Had only ex-felons—those who have served their incarceration, pro-
bation and parole sentences—been permitted to vote, the margin of
Gore's victory would still have been 30,000. 103
 Similarly, Washington's
2004 gubernatorial election was also skewed as a result of its felony
disenfranchisement laws.'"
C. Current Debates Surrounding Felony Disenfranchisement
The profound political impact of felony disenfranchisement laws,
particularly in the wake of the 2000 election, has reinvigorated public
and scholarly debate over the subjeci. 1 °3 Much of the recent scholarly
criticism of criminal disenfranchisement has centered on demonstrat-
ing the deficiencies in the political and legal rationales in support of
the practice, a consideration conspicuously absent from the
Richardson decision.'°6
 Substantial questions exist concerning whether
the purposes served by criminal disenfranchisement statutes are suffi-
ciently rational or compelling to survive constitutional scrutiny. 107
Traditional justifications supporting the disenfranchisement of
felons generally characterize the practice as within the regulatory
authority of states to administer elections. 108 Other courts and corn-
102 See Uggen & Manza, supra note 14, at 792-93. The 40,000 vote figure is based on
the scholar's most conservative turnout estimate (13.6%). Id.
103 Id.
104
 Republicans Allege 1,108 Felons Voted Illegally in Election, SmA-rr.LE TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at
132, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002187533  Jelons23m.
html.
105 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
106 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53-56. By finding a textual authorization within the Four-
teenth Amendment for state criminal disenfranchisement regimes, the Richardson decision
eschewed the more difficult question of whether a valid justification exists for the practice.
See id. (grounding its decision in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment without approval
of the policies underlying criminal disenfranchisement); Ewald, supra note 14, at 1072;
Karlan, supra note 14, at 1154 Mlle Court's analysis in [Richardson] short-circuited any
discussion of why states might disenfranchise offenders: The Court simply held that they
could.") (emphasis added).
'1)7 See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 Tv.x. Rxv. L. Sc Pot.. 159, 172-77 (2002)
(discussing the viability of state justifications for criminal disfranchisement); Ewald, supra
note 14, at 1072-1137 (same); Karlan, supra note 14, at 1150-55, 1164-69 (same); Mark E.
Thompson, Don't Do the Crime If You Ever Intend to Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchise-
ment of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 186-98
(2002) (same); Saxonhouse, supra note 14, at 1624 (same).
08 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) ("[B]ecause the purpose of [criminal dis-
enfranchisement] is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this law is
sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise."); Green, 380 F.2d
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mentators have suggested that disfranchising felons falls within the
states' province as , a form of criminal punishment.mg Since the 2000
election, scholars have closely scrutinized and generally cast doubt as
to the validity of both the regulatory and penal justifications.n° The
at 450 (holding that because New York's felony disenfranchisement provision was regula-
tory and not punitive, it was immune to challenges on Eighth Amendment cruel and un-
usual punishment grounds). Those espouSing the regulatory justification for felony dis-
franchisement suggest that the practice functions as a valid regulatory tool for protecting
the "purity of the ballot box." Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884). First, by their
actions, felons have demonstrated an antipathy toward law; disenfranchising citizens is
necessary to prevent criminals from casting subversive votes bent on undermining the
criminal code. Green, 380 F.2d at 451-52; see also 148 CONG. REC. 5803 (daily ed. Feb. 14,
2002) (statement of Sen. Sessions) ("[Felons'] judgment and character is such that they
ought not to be making decisions on the most important issues facing our country."). Sec-
ond, prohibiting felons from electoral participation is a valid regulatory mechanism to
prevent electoral fraud. See Richardson, 418 'U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A related
argument posits criminal disenfranchisement statutes as a valid regulatory measure be-
cause felons lack the character necessary to cast a vote responsibly. Clegg, supra note 107,
at 174 (arguing that even after recognition' of voting as a fundamental right, states retain
the authority to disqualify from the franchise those citizens, like children and the insane,
who lack trustworthiness or loyalty).
1419 See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978, reh'g
en bane granted, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004). An argument related to the punitive rationale
posits criminal disfranchisement as a "collateral consequence" of a felony, like losing the
right to bear arms or serve on juries. See 148 CoNG. REC. 5803 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Sessions) (IA) person who violates serious laws of a State or Federal
Government forfeits their right to participate in those activities of that government.");
Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Convic-
tion, 6 GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 258-62 (2002) (listing typical contemporary collateral
consequences); Clegg, supra note 107, at 174.
110
 For a rejection of the regulatory rationale for disfranchising felons, see, for exam-
ple, Richardson, 418 U.S. at 79-80 (Marshall; J., dissenting) (disqualifying felons from fran-
chise is both over- and underinclusive as a means to prevent voting fraud); Karlan, supra
note 14, at 1152 (citing Carrington v. Rash', 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)) (disqualifying voters
out of fear that they may cast subversive votes is constitutionally impermissible); Thomp-
son, supra note 107, at 195-96 (noting there is no evidentiary basis to support the proposi-
tion that felons will cast subversive votes). For a critique of the punitive rationale, see, for
example, John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against Felony Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEF-
rEasoN L. REV. 157, 181-88 (2004) (categorizing criminal disfranchisement as punitive
renders it vulnerable to an Eighth Amendment challenge); Fletcher, supra note 14, at
1904-06 (suggesting the vulnerability of criminal disfranchisement to Bill of Attainder
challenges if categorized as punitive); Karlan, supra note 14, at 1164-69; FELLNER &
MAUER, supra note 14, at 16 (arguing that criminal disenfranchisement statutes are dispro-
portional because disenfranchisement statutes attach automatically upon conviction and
thus do not permit for judicial tailoring of , the sentence to fit the crime). One study has
found a strong correlation between permanent disenfranchisement and inmate recidivism.
See generally Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manz, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence
from a Community Sample (2005), http://www.soc.umn.edu/%7Euggen/Uggen_Manza
 04_
CHRLR2.pdf (suggesting a correlation between permanent disenfranchisement and inmate
recidivism).
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practice has also come under renewed attack for its grossly dispropor-
tionate impact on minority voters."'
III. CHALLENGING FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT UNDER THE VRA
State criminal disenfranchisement has faced renewed attacks not
only in scholarship, but in the courts as well." 2 With the fundamental
rights challenge, rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, foreclosed by the Richardson v. Ramirez and Hunter
v. Underwood framework—barring an affirmative demonstration of illicit
legislative intent—litigants have shifted their efforts to overturn state
criminal disenfranchisement laws to section 2 of the VRA as amended
in 1982.115 These VRA challenges rest exclusively on the race-based ob-
jections outlined above." 4 The thrust of the allegation is that criminal
disenfranchisement interacts with racial animus in the criminal justice
system to deprive impermissibly citizens of the right to vote on account
of their race. 15 This strategy has had mixed success in the courts. 118
This Part examines the state of these challenges, beginning with
a general discussion of the VRA's scope and ,purpose. 117 It notes that
while ostensibly passed to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, the VRA restricts state authority to regulate franchise
rights more effectively than the Amendments themselves." 8 The Part
"I See, e.g., Behrens & Uggen, supra note 14, at 596 (observing a positive correlation
between the likelihood and severity of states' felony disenfranchisement laws and the per-
centage of non-whites in prison); Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1899-1900 (arguing that the
racial impact of criminal disfranchisement resuscitates the United States' historical of in-
tentional and open defiance of minority voting rights, and thus renders the policy unten-
able); Andrew Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A
New Strategy, 103 YALE Li 537,537-43 (1993) (noting the historical correlation between
the Fifteenth Amendment's enforcement and the rise of state criminal disenfranchisement
provisions ).
112 See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,1230 (11th Cir. 2005); Muntaqim v.
Coombe, 366 F.3d 102,116-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978, reh'g en banc granted, 396
F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004); Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan II), 338 F.3d 1009,1014-23
(9th Cir. 2003).
115 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116-30; Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at
1014-23. See generally Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
114 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230; Muntaqim, 366 F.3(1 at 116-30; Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at
1014-23; supra 89-104.
115 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116-30; Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at
1014-23.
116
 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116-30; Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at
1014-23.
117 See infra notes 121-279 and accompanying text.
116 See infra notes 121-62 and accompanying text.
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then summarizes the 1982 Amendment to the VRA, which abrogated
plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate illicit intent in proving voting dis-
crimination. 119
 Finally, it looks at litigants' attempts to use the 1982
Amendment to invalidate felony disenfranchisement statutes and the
various courts' responses. 12°
A. Scope and Purpose of the VRA
Congress passed the VRA in 1965 to eliminate racially discrimi-
natory voting regulations and practices. 121
 The VRA accomplishes this
goal primarily through two provisions, section 2 and section 5. 122 Sec-
tion 5 requires that particular states and municipalities, which have
demonstrated a historical hostility to minority voting rights, must at-
tain pre-clearance from the U.S. Attorney General before implement-
ing a voting practice or requirement. 123
 Section 2 applies nationwide
and prohibits any voting requirement that has the purpose or effect
of denying or diluting voting rights on account of race or color. 124
Because the Act targets racial discrimination in voting, a particu-
larly pernicious evil, the Supreme, Court has given the provisions their
"broadest possible scope." 125
 Congress's frustration with the ineffec-
tiveness of the Fifteenth Amendment prompted the passage of the
VRA.126 Despite the Amendment's prohibition of racial discrimination
in voting, states contrived sophisticated and ostensibly neutral election
practices that sought to, and successfully did, evade the Fifteenth
Amendment's requirements.'" The VRA's primary purpose was to root
out these seemingly innocuous—but operationally discriminatory—vot-
ing practices. 128
 Further underpinning the breadth of the VRA's scope
is the fundamentality of individual voting rights. 12
 It is not merely state
discrimination, but discrimination in voting, insofar as it touches on in-
116 See infra notes 163-94 and accompanying text.
12° See infra notes 195-279 and accompailying text.
12 ' See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
122 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 197313b-1 (2000).
122 Id. § 1973c.
124 Id. § 1973 (a)—(b).
125 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969); see also Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874, 895 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
126
 See Hokin; 512 U.S. at 895; Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66; S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5 (1982),
as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 181-82.
127 See Holden 512 U.S. at 895; Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66; S. Rio'. No. 97417, at 5, as re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 181-82.
128 See Holder, 512 U.S. at 895; Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66; S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5, as re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 181-82.
129 Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66.
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dividuals' fundamental rights, that compels the broadest possible read-
ing of the VRA. 13°
 Thus, although ostensibly passed pursuant Con-
gress's enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that the VRA may invalidate even
those state electoral practices that do not violate the Fifteenth Amend-
ment itself. 131
For example, in 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach held that Congress did not exceed its constitutional
authority by requiring South Carolina to pre-clear its literacy test, de-
spite finding literacy tests constitutionally permissible just seven years
earlier in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections. 132 The Su-
preme Court subsequently upheld the VRA's temporary suspensions
of literacy tests in North Carolina and later the permanent prohibi-
tion of literacy tests nationwide. 1 " These cases signal that Congress
may prohibit voting practices and prerequisites that are not in and of
themselves unconstitutional. 134
In 1970, in Oregon v. Mitchell—which denied a constitutional chal-
lenge to the VRA's nationwide prohibition of literacy tests—the Su-
preme Court explained why the VRA may reach beyond the Franchise
Amendments and remain an appropriate use of Congress's author-
ity.'" First, Congress had a record of purposefully discriminatory em-
ployment and administration of the literacy tests.'" Under this expla-
nation, the literacy tests themselves likely violated the Fifteenth
Amendment, rendering their invalidation an appropriate use of con-
gressional enforcement power.'" Second, Congress had a record of
unconstitutional discrimination in educational opportunities, a rem-
nant of school segregation.'" Congress may have determined that lit-
eracy tests intersected with educational inequality to perpetuate this
unconstitutional discrimination at the polls.'"
Mitchell's acceptance of the VRA's overinclusion, however, pre-
dated recent Court cases restricting Congress's enforcement authority
"6 See id.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326-27.
i" Id.; Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
"3
 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,132-34 (1970); Gaston County v. United States,
395 U.S. 285,289,292-93 (1969).
134 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,174-77 (1980).
"s 400 U.S. at 132-34.
"6 See id. at 132-33.
167 See id.
1 " Id. at 133-34.
199 Seetid.
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under the Reconstruction Amendments.' 4° At the time the Supreme
Court decided Mitchell, it permitted Congress substantial deference to
determine the necessary legislation for enforcement of the Recon-
struction Amendments."' The judicial limitation on Congress's en-
forcement authority was the same as its authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 142 The Court noted: "Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutionarms
In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flows, the Supreme Court held that the
Reconstruction Amendments give Congress the power to enforce, but
not define, the constitutional rights granted by the Reconstruction
Amendments. 144
 In overturning the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(the "RFRA"), Flores altered the scope of congressional power under the
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment. 145
Flores held that in order for Congress to exercise its remedial authority
pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress must show "a
congruence and proportionality" between the remedy imposed and the
injury prevented. 140
 If the remedial measure enacted by Congress
proves overinclusive, or not in congruence and proportion to the in-
jury prevented, then Congress has exceeded its remedial authority and
instead impermissibly created a new substantive right. 147
The Flores test is a two-step inquiry. 148 A court must first identify
which constitutional rights Congress seeks to enforce (congruence),
and then second determine whether the scope of the remedy is suffi-
ciently tailored to enforce them (proportionality). 149 The congruence
prong most often requires a congressional demonstration of a pattern
of unconstitutional state behavior.'" The proportional prong requires
140
 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
141 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
142 Id.
' 4' Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
144 521 U.S. at 520.
145 See id.
He Id.
147 See id. at 520-21.
148 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23, 529 (2004) (interpreting the Flores
test).
149 See id.
150 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 525-27, 530 (faulting the RFRA for failing to include a con-
gressional finding of a pattern of unconstitutional behavior); see also Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (finding congressional revocation of state
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that the scope of the law limit its reach to only the unconstitutional
behavior.' 51
Thus, recent precedent has substantially restricted Congress's en-
forcement authority under the Reconstruction Arnendments. 152 Never-
theless, the VRA's overinclusiveness has survived these limitations.'"
Flores itself cites the VRA approvingly—the literacy test cases in particu-
lar—as appropriate even under the congruent and proportional stan-
dard—as opposed to the Necessary and Proper Clause. 154
 In fact, sev-
eral cases applying the Flores standard laud the VRA as a benchmark of
appropriate legislation, against which all other remedial legislation
should be measured. 155
Flores offered three reasons why the VRA persists as an appropriate
use of congressional authority, despite the judicial limiting of Con-
gress's power. 158
 The first two reasons simply echoed the reasons in
Mitchell. 157
 First, Congress had a clear record of unconstitutional dis-
crimination in voting, and therefore was simply redressing unconstitu-
tional behavior.' 58
 Second, Congress had a clear pattern of impermissi-
ble discrimination in education, the effect of which was borne out in
the literacy tests. 158
 Thus, Congress had a demonstrated record of un-
constitutional and insidious state conduct, and it chose a remedy—the
prohibition of literacy tests—tailored to ameliorate the effects of that
conduct. 18° The third reason Flores offered for the VRA's appropriate-
ness is somewhat more expansive: prohibiting literacy tests because of
their racially discriminatory impact is necessary because voting helps
sovereign immunity incongruent absent a congressional record evidencing a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination); Kittle] v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,89 (2000); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,640 (1999).
151 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 529; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,626-27 (2000)
(overturning the Violence Against Women Act as a disproportional use of Congress's en-
forcement authority because the legislation did not limit its scope to those states where the
record demonstrated a patterned subjugation of women's rights).
152 See supra notes 207-29 and accompanying text.
153 See Flares, 521 U.S. at 525-33.
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. at 519 n.4; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at
640.
136 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 525-31; Pamela Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives:
Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 725,728-31 (1998).
157 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 526-27; Karlan, supra note 156, at 728-29.
153 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 526-27; Karlan, supra note 156, at 728.
159 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 526; Karlan, supra note 156, at 728-29.
16° See Flores, 521 U.S. at 526; Karlan, supra note 156, at 728-29.
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preserve other liberties. 161
 Under this theory, Congress can ban those
voting practices that result in dilution of minority voting strength be-
cause such dilution deprives minority communities of the electoral
clout necessary to safeguard their rights against future government in-
trusions. 162
B. VRA Section 2 and the 1982 Amendment
The recent cases limiting congressional enforcement power un-
der the Reconstruction Amendments cite the VRA as an appropriate
use of congressional enforcement power. 163 The VRA provisions refer-
enced, however, pre-date the amendments to the VRA that Congress
enacted in 1982. 164 Whether the VRA as amended retains that constitu-
tional appropriateness remains uncertain, an uncertainty that the
current criminal disenfranchisement challenges directly address. 163
Section 2 prohibits states from utilizing or administering a voting
practice or qualification that abridges or deprives an individual's right
to vote on account of race. 166 Prior to 1982, the language of section 2
essentially mirrored that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and operated
in much the same way; section 2 functioned as merely a reiteration of
the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting purposeful racial discrimina-
tion in voting. 167 Plaintiffs challenging state suffrage restrictions
161 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 528; Kartan, supra note 156, at 729. Relatedly, a recent Su-
preme Court decision suggested that Congress's enforcement authority may be broader
when acting to vindicate a fundamental right. See. Lane, 541 U.S. at 528-29.
162 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 528; Katiall, supra note 156, at 729.
163 See, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. at 519 n.4; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626; Fla. Prefiaid, 527 U.S. at
640; Flores, 521 U.S. at 531-32.
164 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 531-32.
165 See Jennifer G. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Consti-
tutionality After City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 624-31 (2004). In 1984, in
Mississippi Republican Executive Committee a Brooks, however, the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed a lower court decision rejecting a constitutional challenge to section 2. 469 U.S.
1002, 1003 (1984). The Court affirmed the lower court ruling that section 2 could pro-
hibit practices not enacted with discriminatOry intent without exceeding the powers vested
in Congress by the Fifteenth Amendment. 4 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
presumed, but never directly addressed, the section's constitutionality. See Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 991-92 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Noting the unanimous affirmation of
the provision's constitutionality, though, Justice O'Connor advised that lower courts con-
tinue to treat section 2 as constitutional "unless and until current lower court precedent is
reversed and it is held unconstitutional." Id. These cases pre-dated Flores and its progeny,
however, and so the VRA's constitutionality post-Flares remains an open question. See Flores,
521 U.S. at 520; Vera, 517 U.S. at 991-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Brooks, 469 U.S. at
1003.
'66 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)—(b) (2000).
167 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980).
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needed to demonstrate purposeful discrimination in an election law's
enactment in order to prevail. 168
 Consequently, in 1980, the Supreme
Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden held that plaintiffs had no actionable
claim under the VRA on the theory that an at-large districting plan
diluted the African-American vote absent a showing of subjective dis-
crimination on the part of the legislature. 169
Justices White and Marshall both dissented from the Bolden deci-
sion on separate grounds.'" Justice White's dissent contended that suf-
ficient circumstantial evidence existed to permit an inference of illicit
legislative intent, and therefore the districting plan could violate the
Fifteenth Amendment."' He outlined a list of objective factors, previ-
ously articulated in the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in White v. Reges-
lei; that a court should consider as circumstantial evidence to support a
finding of impermissible legislative purpose.'" On the other hand, Jus-
tice Marshall contended that no inference of discriminatory intent was
necessary because voting is a fundamental, individual right.'" Citing
Warren-era precedents that recognized voting rights as fundamental,
Marshall's dissent argued that vote dilution, as much an affront to the
one-man, one-vote principle as vote denial, deprives individuals of their
constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
thus a state may not deprive a citizen of that right regardless of its in-
tent. 174
Congress enacted the 1982 Amendment largely in response to the
Bolden decision, and largely adopted Justice Marshall's reasoning.'"
The 1982 Amendment relieves plaintiffs challenging legislation under
the VRA's section 2 of the difficult burden of proving subjective dis-
criminatory intent.'" The motivation for the 1982 Amendment was
168 See id.
169 Id. at 61.
17° See id. at 94-103 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 103-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171
 Id. at 103 (White, J., dissenting).
' 72 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 95-97 (White, J., dissenting) (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755,766-67 (1973)). Congress subsequently adopted these factors and incorporated them
into the "totality of circumstances" test required by the 1982 Amendment to the Voting
Rights Act. See infra notes 182-83.
175
 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 118,120-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 115-20.
175 See Thornburg v. tingles, 478 U.S. 30,43-44 (1986) (reading the 1982 Amendment
to the VRA as effectively overturning the Bolden requirement of showing purposeful dis-
crimination); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 61; S. REP. No. 97-417, at 27-28,36-37 (1982), as reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,204-06,214-15 (noting that the purpose of the Amendments
was to repeal Bolden and to focus the judicial inquiry only into whether there exists equal
access to electoral opportunity).
176 See 42 U.S.C. 1973 (a)—(h) (2000).
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two-fold: part theoretical and part pragmatic.'" At the theoretical level,
Congress believed that the judicial focus on legislative intent asked "the
wrong question."178 The appropriate inquiry under the VRA should
focus solely on whether minority communities have equal access to the
electoral process; legislative intent has no bearing on that question. 178
At the pragmatic level, Congress recognized that forcing litigants to
prove discriminatory intent was an inordinate, sometimes impossible,
burden for plaintiffs to meet. 188 Moreover, imposing an intent test on
litigants would lead to racial divisiveness, as it requires accusations of
racism and prejudice. 181
Accordingly, the amended section 2 now mandates a plaintiff
demonstrate only that the challenged voting procedure or qualifica-
tion "results" in a denial or dilution of the vote on account of race or
color.' 82 Subsection (b) of section 2 further clarifies that an electoral
practice or standard will violate the Act if a court determines that by a
"totality of circumstances," the Act affords minority citizens less op-
portunity to participate in the political process or less opportunity to
elect their chosen representatives. 183
in See S. R.F.P. No. 97-417, at 36, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177, 214; see also
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-46.
178 5. REP. No. 97-417, at 36, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CA.N. 177, 214.
179 Id. at 38.
18° Id. at 36.
1B1 Id.
1" See 42 U.S.C. §1973 (a) (2000). The relevant text of the provision reads:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in
a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are nut equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsec-
tion (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one cir-
cumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section es-
tablishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
185 Id. § 1973 (b). In applying the "totality of circumstances test" the Senate Report ac-
companying the statute indicates the following factors as a non-exhaustive list appropriate
for judicial consideration: 1) the extent of historical discrimination in voting within the
state; 2) the existence and extent of racially polarized voting; 3) the historical use of cer-
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By shifting a plaintiffs burden from discriminatory intent to dis-
criminatory results (the "results test"), Congress aimed to prevent state
legislatures from shirking the VRA's express purpose—eliminating ra-
cial discrimination in voting—by enacting facially neutral election laws
that, in practice, create electoral inequalities for non-whites, 18" The
1982 Amendment, at its core, seeks to further the purposes of the VRA
by removing even ostensibly race-neutral systemic processes that inhibit
minority communities' capacities for political empowerment. 185 The
VRA accomplishes this aim by changing the standard of review for judi-
cial consideration under section 2. 186
Under the amended section 2, plaintiffs challenging state elec-
tion practices no longer need "smoking gun" evidence of a state's il-
licit purpose or motivation. Rather, the presiding court need only de-
termine, though a fact-intensive inquiry of a variety of factors, that the
election practice operates so as to undermine racial equality in elec-
toral opportunity.'" The legislative purpose behind the challenged
voting procedure itself is of no moment, for the sole inquiry is into
whether the procedure operates to dilute or deny electoral equality to
racial minorities. 188
Although the 1982 Amendment textually abrogates the plaintiffs
burden to demonstrate illicit legislative intent when making race-based
challenges to state electoral regulations, it stops short of mandating
proportional representation. 189 Section 2 prohibits voting practices that
result in unequal participatory opportunity, not in unequal electoral
outcomes.'" Thus, courts have refused to find disparate impact alone
tain electoral schemes known to dilute minority participation; 4) denial of access to the
process of candidate slating; 5) the extent to which minorities still bear the effects of dis-
crimination in areas "such as education, employment and health," that frustrate or impede
their access to the political process; 6) whether campaigns have made, or been character-
ized as having made, overt or subtle racial appeals; 7) the success of minority candidates in
pursuit of elective office; 8) whether elected officials have demonstrated an unresponsive-
ness to the particularized need of the minority communities; and 9) whether the policy
underlying the challenged voting practice or standard is pretextual or tenuous. S. REP. No.
97-417, at 28-29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,205-07.
184
 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-47.
"85 See id.
188 See Presto, supra note 165, at 628.
187
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)—(b) (2000); S. Rm.. No. 97-417, at 28-29, as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,205-07.
188
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)—(b); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29, as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,205-07.
188
 42 U.S.C. li1973(b).
190 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-46.
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sufficient to meet the results test. 191 Instead, the VRA prohibits those
voting practices that exacerbate past or private discrimination. 192 The
voting scheme promulgated by the legislature need not be purposefully
discriminatory in and of itself to violate the VRA's amended section
2. 193 It must, however, interact with "social and historical conditions" so
as to perpetuate existing racial discrimination and translate these con-
ditions into electoral inequality.194
C. Applying Section 2 to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws
Litigants challenging felony disenfranchisement under the VRA
contend that disfranchising criminals violates section 2's "results test."'"
In theory, qualifying electoral participation on non-commission of a
felony interacts with racial bias within the criminal justice system—a
"social and historical condition"—to illegally dilute minority electoral
participation. 196 To demonstrate discrimination in the criminal justice
system, plaintiffs typically offer statistical evidence demonstrating dispa-
rate arrest rates, charging decisions and sentencing outcomes that dis-
proportionately impact minorities. 197
As this litigation strategy has progressed through the courts, it has
necessitated revisiting two questions. 198
 The first concerns the scope of
congressional intent behind the VRA; more particularly, did Congress
intend the VRA to reach state felony disenfranchisement laws?'" The
second question resuscitates the question of section 2's constitutional-
ity.2" This question is not a broad-based facial challenge to the validity
of the VRA itself, but, rather, whether the VRA's results test would ex-
ceed congressional enforcement authority under the Reconstruction
Amendments if applied to state felony disenfranchisement statutes. 201
More specifically, would extending section 2 to invalidate state criminal
disenfranchisement statutes enacted without illicit intent render it out
191 Id. at 46-47.
192 See id. at 47.
198 See id.
194 Id.
198 See Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1009,1012-13.
19(1 Id.
197 See id. at 1013.
198
 See Muntaqinl, 366 F.3d at 116.
1" See id.
200 See Muntagim, 366 F.3d at 118-26; Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan III), 359 F.3d
1116,1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en halm).
201 See Mundalim, 366 F.3d at 121.
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of congruence and proportion with the injury it seeks to redress? 202
The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on both of these issues, and
thus have rendered contradictory positions on whether plaintiffs chal-
lenging criminal disenfranchisement provisions may proceed under the
vRA.2o3
1. Opinions Rejecting the Application of Section 2 to the Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws
Three recent circuit opinions rejected the application of the VRA
to criminal disenfranchisement provisions: Johnson v. Governor of Florida,
a 2005 case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit; Muntaqim v. Coombe, a 2004 case before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit; and the dissenting opinion in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' denial of a rehearing en bane in its
2003 Farrakhan v. Washington decision. 204
 All three have refused to ex-
tend the VRA to criminal disenfranchisement laws on two grounds:
1) Congress did not intend for the VRA to reach state criminal disen-
franchisement laws, and 2) Congress lacks the authority to reach state
criminal disenfranchisement laws." 5
202 Id. ("The question before us is not whether Congress exceeded its authority when it
enacted § 1973; rather it is whether Congress would exceed its authority if § 1973 were ap-
plied to felon disenfranchisement statutes.").
2113 See id. at 124; Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
2 D4 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116-30; Farrakhan III, 359 E3d
at 1120-27 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
205 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116-30; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d
at 1120-27 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). Two other circuit
decisions addressed similar challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws, but neither deci-
sion is pertinent to this Note. See Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919,920 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley v.
Collins, 791 F.2d 1255,1257 (6th Cir. 1986). In 1986, in Wesley o. Collins, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit presumed without determining the applicability of
the VRA to Tennessee's felony disenfranchisement statute. See 791 F.2d at 1259-61. In
1996, in Baker v. Pataki, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard a
challenge to New York's felon disenfranchisement statute under the VRA. 85 F.3d at 920.
The en banc court split evenly as to the applicability of the VRA to felony disenfranchise-
ment, thus rendering the case without precedential effect. Id. at 921 n.2. The Second Cir-
cuit's 2003 opinion in Muntaqim elaborated upon and resolved the split opinion in Baker
and thus constitutes the prevailing view in the Second Circuit. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at
107-11,116.
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a. Did Congress Intend the VRA to Reach Criminal Disenfranchisement
Laws?
The first objection relies on the "plain statement" rule as articu-
lated in the Supreme Court's 1991 decision, Gregory v. Ashcroft.206 There,
the Supreme Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (the "ADEA") did not invalidate Missouri's constitutional require-
ment that judges retire at age seventy. 2°7
 The ADEA, which generally
forbids mandated retirement, applied to all "employees" except ap-
pointees "on the policy making level."2°8 The Gregory Court held that
the "appointee" exception was ambiguous as to whether state judges
fell under the exception. 209
 With two plausible constructions of the
ADEA in question, the court erred on the side of preserving the fed-
eral-state balance, and permitted Missouri to retain a law the Court
found "a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign en-
tity."210
 The Court held that in order for Congress to upset the tradi-
tional federal-state constitutional balance, it must make its intention
"unmistakably clear" in the text of the statute. 2 "
In 2004, in Muntaqim, the Second Circuit heard a challenge to
New York's criminal disenfranchisement law under the VRA and held
that Gregory's plain statement rule was applicable.2 ' 2
 The Muntaqim
court found criminal disenfranchisement a traditional state func-
tion. 213 The Muntaqim court couches felony disenfranchisement
within the traditional state authority to punish its criminals. 214
 Fur-
ther, as a regulatory restriction, unlike most voting laws and regula-
tions, criminal disenfranchisement receives special recognition in the
2°6
 501 U.S. 452,460-61 (1991).
207
 Id. at 474.
20H Id. at 464-65.
209 Id.
21° Id. at 460.
211 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
212 Muntagim, 366 F.3d at 126.
" Id. at 121-23.
214 Id. at 123. The Muntaqim opinion stresses disenfranchisement as a form of punish-
ment, and to that extent seems to overturn the Second Circuit's holding in Green v. Board
of Elections of New York that disfranchisement is a non-penal, regulatory practice. Compare id.
(noting that, "there is a longstanding practi'ce in this country of disenfranchising felons as
a form of punishment"), with Green, 380 F.2d at 450 ("Depriving convicted felons of the
franchise is not a punishment but rather is a `nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate
the franchise.'" (citation omitted)). To the extent that the Second Circuit's initial classifi-
cation of New York's disfranchisement proVision as regulatory in its Green decision insu-
lated the law from Eighth Amendment and Bill of Attainder attacks, the Muntaqim opinion
may have left the door open for reviving those challenges. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 123;
Cosgrove, supra note 110, at 181-88; Karlan, supra note 14, at 1164-69.
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Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore remains under the peculiar
and exclusive province of the state. 216
 Any federal encroachment on
these rights, which the Constitution historically reserves to the states,
would necessarily upset the traditional federal-state balance, and so a
clear statement of congressional intent becomes required. 216
In probing the statute's legislative history, the Muntaqim court
found no unmistakably clear statement from Congress that it in-
tended to amend the VRA in 1982 to reach felony disenfranchise-
ment.217
 In fact, there was no mention of criminal disenfranchisement
whatsoever in the passage of the 1982 Amendment.21s Furthermore,
the only mention of felony disenfranchisement in the entire legisla-
tive history of the VRA came in 1965, when Congress specifically ex-
empted felony disenfranchisement statutes from the coverage of an-
other provision.219
 Absent a clear intent to alter the traditional
federal-state balance of power, the Muntaqim court held that section 2
of the VRA was inapplicable to felony disenfranchisement laws. 2"
The Johnson court and the dissent in Farrakhan essentially echoed
the Muntaqim opinion finding no affirmative congressional intent to
extend the VRA to reach criminal disenfranchisement laws. 221 The
dissenting opinion in the decision to deny a rehearing en banc in the
Ninth Circuit's Farrakhan decision also points to the 1993 National
Voter Registration Act as evidence that Congress never intended to
invalidate state criminal disenfranchisement laws. 222 That law ex-
pressly lists criminal conviction as a valid justification for disqualifying
a voter from the franchise. 223
 Why would Congress expressly condone
a law it supposedly intended to invalidate ten years prior? 224 Thus,
215
 See Muntaqini, 366 F.3d at 122-23.
215 Id. at 126.
217
 Id. at 127-28.
219 Id.
219 Id.
229 Muntalim, 366 F.3d at 128-30.
221
 SeeJohnson, 405 F.3d at 1232-34; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1120-21 (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc).
222 Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit points to language from the legislative history of
section 4 of the VRA, expressly exempting criminal disenfranchisement laws from that
section's reach, to further support its holding that Congress did not intend the VRA to
reach criminal disenfranchisement laws.Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233.
223 See Farrakhan ///, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
224 see id.
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these opinions hold, Congress never intended the VRA to reach fel-
ony disenfranchisement regimes. 225
It is important to note though, that in rejecting the application of
the VRA to felony disenfranchisement laws, the Johnson majority and
Farrakhan dissent rested not on the plain statement rule, but on the
canon of constitutional avoidance. 226 These opinions found that the
application of the VRA to criminal disenfranchisement statutes not only
altered the federal-state balance, but also raised serious questions of the
Act's constitutionality. In accordance with the principle of statutory
construction, courts should avoid reading statutes to create constitu-
tional questions absent a clear manifestation of Congress to address
these questions. 227
 Despite the different doctrinal route these opinions
took, they, like Muntaqim, require an affirmative showing of congres-
sional intent to reach criminal disenfranchisement laws. 228
 Since none
of the courts found such a showing, they refused to apply section 2 of
the VRA to criminal disenfranchisement laws. 228
b. Congruence and Proportionality
The Muntaqim and Johnson courts, as well as the dissenting opinion
in Farrahhan, also found that the VRA would be neither congruent nor
proportional to the injury it seeks to remedy if applied to felony disen-
franchisement laws.2" Because such an application would exceed con-
229 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dissenting
From denial of rehearing en bane).
226
 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 ("[Flederal courts should not construe a statute to
create a constitutional question unless there is a clear statement from Congress endorsing
this understanding."); Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1125 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en bane) ("My colleagues fail in their duty not to adopt a constitutionally de-
ficient interpretation of the VRA.").
221 Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229; Farrakhan 111, 359 F.3d at 1125 (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en bane). The Second Circuit in Muntaqim, however, determined
that the constitutional avoidance canon was inapposite because that doctrine requires
statutory ambiguity as a prerequisite to its application and section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act is not ambiguous. See Muntaqim, 366 E3d at 128 11.22 (citing Dept. of Hons. v. Rucker,
535 U.S. 125,134 (2002)). But see Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,208-10 (1998)
(noting that statutory ambiguity is also a requirement for the Gregory plain statement rule).
228 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229; Muntagirn, 366 F.3d at 126-27; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d
at 1125 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
229 See Johnson, 405 F.3d 1230-31; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 130; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at
1127 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
230
 See Johnson, 405 F.3d 1230-31; Muntaqim, 366 F.3t1 at 126; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at
1123-24. These opinions recognize that the VRA may sweep more broadly than the Fif-
teenth Amendment itself. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 119. They assert, however, that apply-
ing the VRA to felony disenfranchisement regimes extends beyond this measure of permis-
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gressional enforcement authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, applying the VRA to felony disenfranchisement statutes
would necessarily jeopardize the Act's constitutionality. 231
On the congruence prong, the Muntaqim opinion holds that the
1982 Amendment to section 2 lacks any congressional findings whatso-
ever to indicate that states use disenfranchisement laws to discriminate
purposefully on account of race. 232
 Absent a finding of discriminatory
intent, Congress has not sufficiently demonstrated a pattern of uncon-
stitutional behavior that would justify the employment of its enforce-
ment authority under the Reconstruction Amendments. 25' Moreover,
the Muntaqim court expressed its reservations about whether Congress
could 'ever amass such a record because state employment of felony
disenfranchisement laws was ubiquitous before the Civil War.234
 Be-
cause felony disenfranchisement statutes pre-date the Civil War, the
contention that states have used them disingenuously to evade the sub-
sequently-enacted Reconstruction Amendments proves a dubious
proposition.233
The Johnson court and the Farrakhan dissent took the congruence
analysis a step further. 256
 Relying on Richardson, they asserted that a
state's prerogative to enact criminal disenfranchisement laws received
explicit constitutional sanction from the Fourteenth Amendment. 237
Because the Fourteenth Amendment expressly permits states the dis-
cretion to disfranchise their felons, using the VRA's section 2 to in-
validate criminal disenfranchisement laws would permit a statute to
trump the Constitution's explicit grant of authority to the states to
disfranchise their felons. 2'8
On the "proportional" prong, all three opinions reasoned that
section 2 of the VRA did not tailor its scope to comport sufficiently
sible latitude. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 119 (noting that the decisions permitting the ex-
tension beyond the Fifteenth Amendment do not "delineate the outer boundaries of Con-
gress's authority").
231
 Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 126.
232 Id.
2" Id.
2" Id. at 123-24.
235/d. at 123.
236 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229-32; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J. , dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en bane).
237 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229-32; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en bane).
238
	 Johnson, 405 F.3(1 at 1229-32; Farrakhan ///, 359 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en bane).
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with the Flores limitation.239 The Muntaqim opinion holds that section
2, as applied to criminal disenfranchisement laws, is substantively
overbroad. 24° Relying on Underwood, the Muntaqim court observes that
criminal disenfranchisement laws are only invalid if motivated by ra-
cial animus. 241
 Any appropriate congressional encroachment on fel-
ony disenfranchisement laws must narrowly target only those enacted
with this illicit intent. 242
 Extending section 2 to criminal disenfran-
chisement laws is disproportionate to the injury it seeks to remedy
because it would invalidate laws enacted with neutral intent, even if
such neutral laws produce a disparate impact.243
The Farrakhan dissent endorsed Muntaqim's substantive reserva-
tions about the scope of section 2 and also expressed additional reser-
vations concerning section 2's geographical scope.244
 Judge Kozinski
held that to be proportional, congressional remedial legislation under
the Reconstruction Amendments must be geographically targeted to
correspond to varied regional threats of Constitutional violations. 245 In
Farrakhan, which addressed a challenge to Washington's felony disen-
franchisement law, the dissent observed that unlike some states—par-
ticularly southern states—Washington does not have a long and pat-
terned history of racial discrimination. 246
 If the VRA could reach felony
disenfranchisement laws, it would have to narrow its geographic scope
to those states most likely to employ these laws in a constitutionally im-
permissible manner. 247
In short, the Johnson and Muntaqim opinions and the Farrakhan
dissent each found the VRA as applied to criminal disenfranchise-
ment laws to be neither congruent nor proportional. 248
 The Four-
teenth Amendment expressly grants states the discretion to disfran-
chise their felons; it is unlikely that any congressional act could
overcome this Constitutional grant of authority. 249 At the very least, a
congressional act would need to amass a more substantial evidentiary
299 See Muntagim, 366 F.3d at 125-26.
24° See id, at 124-26.
241 See id.
242 See id.
249 See id.
244 See Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1123-24 (Kozinski,J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en bane).
245 Id. at 1124 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 1123-24.
248 See. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228-33; Muntagim, 366 F.3d at 126; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3(1
at 1125 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
249 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230.
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record and impose a more tailored remedy to invalidate state felony
disenfranchisement laws without exceeding Congress's enforcement
authority under the Flares test. 25°
2. Opinions Permitting the Application of Section 2 to Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws
The majority opinion in Farrakhan ruled in direct contradiction to
the opinions discussed above. 251
 There, the Ninth Circuit permitted
challenges to criminal disenfranchisement laws under the VRA.252 It
held that neither the federalism nor the constitutional concerns raised
by the dissents and the Muntagim opinion prevented the VRA from
reaching criminal disenfranchisement laws. 255
 Two dissents in the John-
son opinion concluded likewise. 254
a. Did Congress Intend the VRA to Reach Criminal Disenfranchisement
Laws?
In addressing the plain statement rule, the Farrakhan court sim-
ply affirmed the lower court's finding that the plain statement rule is
inapplicable to the VRA. 255
 The district court held the plain statement
inapplicable to the VRA reasoning the plain statement rule only ap-
plied when legislation altered the federal-state balance. 256
 Because the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have already altered the fed-
eral-state balance of power to permit federal . intrusion into traditional
state functions. 257
 Because Congress derives its authority to pass the
VRA from the enforcement clause of these Amendments, it presump-
tively and necessarily alters the federal-state balance, too. 258 The plain
25° See Muntagim, 366 F.3d at 130; Farrakhan III, 359 F.3d at 1125 (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc).
251 Compare Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016 (applying the VRA to state criminal disen-
franchisement laws), withJohnson, 405 F.3d at 1232 (rejecting the application of the VRA to
state criminal disenfranchisement laws), and Muntagim, 366 F.3d at 130 (same), and Farra-
khan III, 359 F.3d at 1125 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(sante).
252
 See Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
255 See id.
25  Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1244 (Wilson, J., dissenting); id. at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissent-
ing).
255 Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
256
 Farrakhan v. Locke (Farrakhan I), 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (E.D. Wash. 1997).
252 Id.
258 Id.
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statement rule is thus inapplicable because in the context of the VRA,
it is superfluous.259
The Ninth Circuit decision affirmed this finding, adding one
brief, yet important point. 260 The Ninth Circuit held that the VRA, by
its plain terms, applies to any voter qualification or prerequisite that
undermines racial equality in electoral opportunity. 26 ' Felony disen-
franchisement is a voting qualification. 262
 To the extent federalism
concerns require a plain statement of Congress's intent to reach fel-
ony disenfranchisement, Congress met that burden by indicating its
intent to reach all state-imposed voting qualifications. 263
b. Congruence and Proportionality
The Farrakhan court also held that the VRA's section 2 comports
with the Flares test, even as applied state to criminal disenfranchise-
ment laws.264
 On the congruence prong, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited criminal disenfranchisement
laws that purposefully discriminated on the basis of race.265 It neces-
sarily followed that Congress has the right to eliminate those laws pur-
suant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.266 Thus,
although the VRA's section 2 protects a state's right to disfranchise
criminals generally, it does not protect states rights to do so in a ra-
cially discriminatory manner. 267
 Congress enacted the VRA to protect
the rights of citizens to be free from discrimination and to remedy
precisely these types of constitutional abuses.268
The Farrakhan court also excused the absence of congressional
findings of patterned impermissible employment and administration
of felony disenfranchisement laws. 269
 First, it noted that the Flores de-
cision itself cited the VRA approvingly as appropriate remedial legisla-
259 See id.
266 See Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
261 Id.
262
 Id.; see also Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
26' See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1250 (Burkett, J., dissenting).
264
 Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268
 See id.; see also Johnson, 1248 F.3d at 1248 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
VRA as applied to criminal disenfranchisement laws would only invalidate those which
result in a denial of the right to vote on account of color).
Farrakhan Il, 338 F.3d at 1016.
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tion under the test articulated therein. 270
 Second, the court held that
racism in voting has been such a deep and persistent problem in the
United States that Congress needs and should be afforded excep-
tional remedies when it seeks to redress that problem. 271 The taint
and effects of racial discrimination, particularly in voting, have been
far more engrained in the social fabric of the country's history than
that of the religious discrimination at issue in the challenged statute
in Flores. 272
 Thus, although congressional findings of recurrent consti-
tutional violations may have been necessary in Flares, they are not in
the context of the VRA. 273
 A dissent in Johnson also reinforced this ar-
gument by emphasizing that when Congress acts to vindicate funda-
mental rights, its enforcement power is at its most expansive, thus re-
laxing the requirement for supporting findings. 274
On the proportional prong, Farrakhan found the VRA's section 2
sufficiently tailored to reach only unconstitutional uses of felony dis-
enfranchisement. 275
 Section 2's "results test" does not proscribe ra-
cially neutral disenfranchisement laws, nor does it proscribe disen-
franchisement laws that merely affect minorities more than whites.276
Rather, section 2 prohibits only those disenfranchisement provisions
that, when evaluated in light of the "totality of circumstances," per-
petuate the effects of past discrimination. 277
 The preeminent function
of the results test is simply to change the standard of review so as to
permit an inference of discrimination where proof of illicit legislative
intent is unavailable. 218
 As applied to criminal disenfranchisement
statutes, the results test merely permits courts to infer Underwood vio-
lations by examining the totality of circumstances instead of relying
on affirmative evidence of impermissible intent. 279
275 Id.
27 ' Id.; see also Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J,, dissenting) (arguing that the ma-
jority's rigid requirement of congressional findings conflicts with Congress's intent to give
the VRA it's broadest possible scope).
212
 Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
275 Id.; see also Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1243 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
need only record a pattern of constitutional violations, not the manner in which a state
abridges constitutional rights, and therefore finding of "no moment" that the record does
not specify criminal disfranchisement as a means for discriminating).
274 SeeJohnson, 405 F.3d at 1242 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
275 Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
276 Id,
277 Li
278 See id.
279 See id.
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IV. EVALUATING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The opinions described above vary widely in their interpretation of
the intended scope of the VRA and the permissible boundaries of Con-
gress's enforcement authority under the Reconstruction Amend-
ments.280 In
 particular, the opinions diverge on whether applying the
VRA's section 2 to felony disenfranchisement laws requires a plain
statement of intent by Congress to do so. 281
 The opinions also disagree
sharply over the severity of the limitation that Section 2 of the Four-
teenth Amendment—as interpreted by Richardson v. Ramirez--imposes
on Congress's enforcement authority under that Ainendment. 282
Reconciliation of these differences is in the offing. 288 The VRA's
section 2 applies nationally, underscoring the need for uniformity of
its interpretation. 284
 It would be senseless to allow the VRA to invali-
date Washington's criminal disenfranchisement statutes, but to find it
inapplicable to New York's or Florida's. 2" Moreover, given the ubiq-
uity of state criminal disenfranchisement laws, and the current con-
troversy surrounding the practice, resolution of this dispute is para-
mount, for the practice's vitality hangs in the balance. 286
This Part examines the merits of the circuit split. 287
 It seeks to
further animate the debate over the federalism and constitutional
concerns raised by this issue. 288 It argues that the Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly disregarded application of the "plain statement" rule and the
constitutional avoidance canon. 289
 It then sides with the Second and
Eleventh Circuits on whether the VRA as applied to criminal disen-
franchisement statutes is a constitutionally valid use of Congress's en-
forcement authority.290
280 See supra notes 195-279 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 206-29,255-63, and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 230-50,264-79, and accompanying text. See generally Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
299
	 supra notes 195-279 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 195-279 and accompanying text.
295
	 supra notes 195-279 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
287 See infra notes 291-359 and accompanying text.
288 See infra notes 291-359 and accompanying text.
289 See infra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
290 See infra notes 318-59 and accompanying text.
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A. Did Congress Intend the VIM to Reach Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws?
The "plain statement" rule and constitutional avoidance canon
should not apply to the VRA because the VRA does not alter the fed-
eral-state balance. 291 The Ninth Circuit addressed this argument briefly
when it noted that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by their
own accord alter this balance.292 Its observation that legislation enforc-
ing the Reconstruction Amendments necessarily also alters the federal-
state balance, thus rendering the plain statement rule superfluous, is
persuasive but deficient on its own. 293 The Reconstruction Amend-
ments undoubtedly disrupted the federal-state balance by permitting
federal intrusion into state functions to remedy constitutional viola-
tions generally, but not every act passed pursuant to them necessarily
touches traditional and sensitive areas of state sovereignty. 294 Gregory v.
Ashcroft, after all, concerned a federal age discrimination statute passed,
in part, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, and a plain statement
from Congress was still required. 295
What bolsters the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the plain statement
rule—though unmentioned by the Ninth Circuit—is the Constitutional
trajectory towards more expansive federal oversight of voting regula-
tions in particular. It is not simply that Congress passed the VRA pur-
suant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments that exempts the
legislation from the plain statement rule. 297 Rather, because the VRA
limits its coverage to only voting regulations—which between the op-
eration of the Franchise Amendments and the categorization of voting
rights as fundamental can no longer be considered a traditional state
function—it does not alter significantly any federal-state balance of
power.298
The Second Circuit's opinion in Muntaqirn v. Coombe holds, how-
ever, that despite the long tradition of federal intrusion on state author-
ity to regulate franchise rights, felony disfranchisement in particular
remains in the peculiar province of the state because it receives explicit
291 See Farrakhan v. Washington (Farralzhan 11), 338 F.3d 1009,1012 (9th Cir. 2003).
292 See id.
295 See id.
294 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,468-69 (1991).
295 See id.
296 See supra notes 1-4,36-58, and accompanying text.
297
 See supra notes 1-4,36-58, and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 1-4,36-58, and accompanying text.
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sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment. 299
 States' discretionary deci-
sion to disfranchise their felons has a long history in the United States,
and currently nearly every state employs the practice in some form."
Thus eliminating criminal disenfranchisement laws alters the federal-
state balance and the plain statement rule should apply in full force."'
Muntaqim essentially requires that Congress explicitly identify felony
disfranchisement as a target of the VRA in order to permit the applica-
tion of the VRA to reach state laws disfranchising felons."
Yet the purpose of the VRA belies this contention." Congress
passed the VRA out of frustration with the ineffectiveness of the Fif-
teenth Amendment and a case-by-case approach to handling discrimi-
natory voting practices." It aimed to eliminate not only obviously un-
constitutional voting practices, but the more subtle ones as well." The
main impetus for the VRA's broad scope was that Congress could not
effectively keep up with the sophisticated practices states concocted to
circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment strictures."
Moreover, even if one searched for a plain statement of intent to
reach criminal disenfranchisement laws through the VRA's section 2,
Congress met that standard." Hunter v. Underwood holds that criminal
disenfranchisement laws are presumptively valid, unless the plaintiff
challenging those laws can prove that the legislature passed the law
with a discriminatory purpose." Allegations of Underwood violations—
racially motivated criminal disenfranchisement measures—generally
299 See. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102,123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978, relek
en boar granted, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d
1214,1228 (11th Cir. 2005).
999 See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 123.
1° 1 See id.
592 See id.
305 See supra notes 121-94 and accompanying text.
" See S. Rio'. No. 97-417, at 5-6 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,181-83.
599 See id.; see also Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1243-44 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting that
"Boerne and its progeny require that the legislative record show a pattern of state constitu-
tional violations, not that the right at issue be abridged in any particular way"); Johnson,
405 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's rigid requirement of
congressional findings conflicts with Congress's intent to give the VRA it's broadest possi-
ble scope).
506 See S. Rio'. No. 97-417, at 5-6, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 181-83; see also
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,565-67 (1969); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1244 (Wil-
son, J., dissenting) (noting that requiring Congress to catalogue specific ways in which
states may violate the Constitution would give states "one free bite at the apple" and un-
dermine Congress's intent to remedy voting rights violation "'comprehensively and fi-
nally" (citations omitted)).
397 See supra notes 163-94 and accompanying text.
we See 471 U.S. 222,233 (1985); see also supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
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fail precisely because plaintiffs cannot affirmatively demonstrate illicit
legislative intent. 30y Congress amended the VRA in 1982 to adopt the
results test, in part, for the pragmatic purpose of alleviating the inordi-
nate burden plaintiffs faced in proving purposeful discrimination moti-
vated the challenged election practice or qualification. 31 °
There is still a more compelling reason why courts should not
require a clear or strong showing of congressional intent before ap-
plying the VRA's section 2 to felony disenfranchisement laws: section
2 is not ambiguous. 3" Both the plain statement rule, invoked by Mun-
tagim, and the constitutional avoidance canon, invoked by Johnson v.
Governor of Florida, require statutory ambiguity as a threshold mat-
ter.312
 Only if the plain meaning of the statute's text presents two •
plausible interpretations may a court invoke these doctrines. 315 Sec-
tion 2 of the VRA applies to all voting qualifications. 314
 Felony disfran-
chisement is a voting qualification. 315
 Reading an exception for felony
disenfranchisement laws into the VRA's section 2 is not an exercise in
statutory construction; it is an exercise in legislative revision and an
impermissible judicial intrusion into the legislative process. 316 Courts
must abide by the plain terms of section 2 and apply the VRA to
criminal disenfranchisement laws.317
so See supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
so See supra notes 163-94 and accompanying text.
s" See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a)–(b) (2000); Muntagim, 366 F.3d at 128 n.22; Farrakhan
338 F.3d at 1016.
512
 Dep't of Hous. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125,134 (2002) (finding ambiguity a prerequi-
site to constitutional avoidance doctrine); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,208-10
(1998) (finding statutory ambiguity a prerequisite to the plain statement rule). See generally
Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1214; Muniaqim, 366 F.3d at 102.
313 See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134; Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208-10.
314 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a)–(b); Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016. The Johnson majority
states, in a footnote, that section 2 is ambiguous because of the inclusion of the phrase "on
account of color." 405 F.3d at 1229 n.30. Whether a particular voting practice deprives or
dilutes the vote "on account of color" is the ultimate question of fact to be determined by
the application of the totality of circumstances test. Id. at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting). It
does not bear on the scope of the Act's coverage, which unambiguously applies to all vot-
ing qualification, prerequisites, standards, practices, or procedures. Id. The Johnson court's
alternative basis for finding ambiguity—because "deep division among eminent judicial
minds on the issue" exists—is unpersuasive because it merely affirms the consequent. See
id. at 1229 n.30.
515 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a)–(b); Farrakhan II, 338 F.3d at 1016.
316 See Rucker; 535 U.S. at 134; Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208-10.
917 See Rucker; 535 U.S. at 134; Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208-10.
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B. Congruence and Proportionality
Faced with the plain and unambiguous terms of section 2, courts
must abide by that language and apply section 2 to state criminal disen-
franchisement laws. 318
 Thus, avoidance principles are inapposite, and
courts must address the constitutionality of such an application. 319
As an initial matter, the opinions holding that the use of section 2 to
proscribe felony disenfranchisement laws would exceed Congress's en-
forcement authority reach that conclusion prematurely. 3" The Supreme
Court's summary affirmation of section 2's constitutionality in Mississippi
Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, and Justice O'Connor's explicit
instructions in her concurring opinion in Bush v. Vera for lower courts to
presume the constitutionality of section 2 "unless and until" the Supreme
Court holds otherwise should preclude these circuit courts from so find-
ing."' The opinions finding section 2 unconstitutional as applied to
criminal disenfranchisement statutes blatantly ignored her message.'"
Nevertheless, the results reached by Muntaqim and Johnson would
likely win should the Supreme Court resolve this conflict."' Section 2
as applied to felony disenfranchisement statutes does exceed Con-
gress's enforcement power as limited by the City of Boerne v. Flores
test.324
 The dispute between the circuits as it currently stands, how-
ever, focuses exclusively and therefore excessively on states' rights to
disfranchise their felons.326 The Johnson and Muntaqim opinions, and
the Farrakhan dissent, citing Richardson, noted that states enjoy a con-
stitutionally protected right to choose to disqualify criminals from the
franchise.326
 Permitting the VRA to reach those laws infringes on the
states' Fourteenth Amendment right to exercise that discretion, and
thereby exceeds Congress's enforcement authority. 327 The Farrakhan
court, and the Johnson dissents, citing Underwood, hold that states do
318 See supra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 291-317 and accompanying text.
32° See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,991-92 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Miss. Re-
publican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002,1003 (1984).
521 See Vera, 517 U.S. at 991-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Brooks, 469 U.S. at 1003.
322 Brooks, 469 U.S. at 1003 (summarily affirming the Amendment's constitutionality).
Compare Vera, 517 U.S. at 991-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advising lower courts to pre-
sume the Amendment's constitutionality), with Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 126 (finding the
1982 Amendment in excess of congressional enforcement authority).
323
 See infra notes 325-59 and accompanying text.
324 See infra notes 325-59 and accompanying text.
323
 See supra notes 230-50,264-79, and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 230-50 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 230-50 and accompanying text.
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not enjoy the right to disfranchise felons for the purpose of discrimi-
nating against minority voters. 328
 Permitting section 2 to reach those
laws simply enables courts to root out those unconstitutional applica-
tions of criminal disenfranchisement, and thereby comports with Con-
gress's enforcement author ty.329
Neither side gives appropriate consideration to the individual
rights at stake. 330
 The congruence prong of the Flores test requires an
analysis of "the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to
enforce."331
 This requires an analysis that focuses not on a state's right
to disfranchise its felons, but on what individual constitutional rights
Congress sought to enforce through the adoption of the "results test"
in 1982 .332
This question becomes murky in the context of voting rights juris-
prudence because the Reconstruction Amendments protect the right
to vote in two distinct ways. 355
 By consequence of the Franchise
Amendments and the antidiscrimination strand of the Equal Protection
Clause, individuals enjoy the right to be free from discrimination in
voting (what could be called their antidiscrimination rights) and a state
may not confer voting rights in a manner that discriminates on the ba-
sis of race or sex unless it passes strict scrutiny. 334
 By consequence of the
Warren-era voting rights jurisprudence, individuals also enjoy a broader
substantive right to vote and have equal access to the electoral process;
a state may not infringe on that individual right for any reason, unless it
can meet the requirements of strict scrutiny. 355
 The VRA operates to
enforce both of these rights at some levels; it seeks to eradicate racism
in voting and to ensure equal electoral opportunity.336
In the context of whether Congress may permissibly extend fran-
chise rights to felons, however, distinguishing between these two rights
becomes crucial. 337 Richardson and its progeny effectively deprive felons
of their fundamental, individual substantive right to vote."' Underwood,
328 See supra notes 264-79 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 264-79 and accompanying text.
13° See supra notes 230-50, 264-79, and accompanying text.
331
 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,522-23 (2004).
332 See id.
333 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
120 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
334 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,231-33 (1985).
333
 See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 121-94 and accompanying text.
337 See infra notes 338-59 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
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however, stands for the proposition that felons retain their antidis-
crimination rights. 339 Thus, the question of whether extending the
VRA's section 2 to criminal disenfranchisement statutes constitutes an
appropriate use of Congress's enforcement authority depends on
which font of authority Congress relied upon in enacting the results
test. 340
 If Congress enacted the results test to protect individuals' anti-
discrimination rights, the 1982 Amendment would likely be an appro-
priate exercise of federal enforcement power under the Reconstruction
Amendments, even as applied to felony disenfranchisement laws, be-
cause felons retain the right to be free from discrimination in voting."'
On the other hand, if Congress enacted the results test to vindicate in-
dividuals' fundamental rights to cast a meaningful vote, then applying
the results test to invalidate criminal disenfranchisement laws would
exceed Congress's enforcement authority because felons do not enjoy
fundamental, substantive voting rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 342
When framed in this context, it becomes clear that section 2 can-
not constitutionally apply to criminal disenfranchisement statutes. 343
Antidiscrimination rights' violations under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments require a showing of discriminatory intents"
Congress considered and rejected adopting the totality of circum-
stances test in order to permit judicial inference of that intent. 343
asp
	 Underwood, 471 U.S. at 231-33; supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
340 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23,
341 See a
342 See id.
343 See infra notes 344-55 and accompanying text.
344 See Underwood, 471 U.S. at 231-33; see also supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
343 S. REP. No. 97-417, at 37 (1982), as. reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,215 ('°This
defect cannot be cured completely even though plaintiffs are allowed to establish dis-
criminatory intent by use of a wide variety of circumstantial and indirect evidence, includ-
ing proof of the same factors used to establish a discriminatory result."). Presumably, Con-
gress could have adopted justice White's dissent in the City of Mobile v. Bolden decision, and
allowed the totality of circumstances test to constitute circumstantial evidence permitting a
judicial inference of illicit legislative intent. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 103 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Congress, however, worried that if the totality of circumstances test supported only an
inference of illicit intent, states could too easily rebut that inference by putting forth a
non-discriminatory rationale for the challenged voting practice. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 37,
as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 2I5. Of course, Congress does require that courts
consider the totality of circumstances, and that the voting practice in question interact
with social and historical conditions to perpetuate the past effects of discrimination. See
supra notes 264-79 and accompanying text. The legislative history makes clear, however,
that this limitation operates not to permit an inference of discriminatory intent, but rather
to ensure that protecting minority rights to equal electoral opportunity does not mandate
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Rattler, it determined that the question of what legislators intended
asked the "wrong question."3" Congress's preeminent purpose in ab-
rogating the intent requirement was to redirect judicial inquiry to the
question of whether minorities have "equal access to the electoral pro-
cess."347
 The right to equal poll access and voting strength stems di-
rectly from the Warren-era voting rights cases and their progressive
recognition of the right to vote as fundamental. 3" Thus, by enacting
the 1982 Amendment, Congress acted pursuant to its enforcement
authority under the fundamental rights strand of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 349
 The rights Congress sought to enforce by abrogating
section 2's intent standard were individuals' rights to vote as guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 350
 Because felons lack the funda-
mental, substantive voting rights granted by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress has no remedial authority with respect to their
substantive, individual voting rights. 331
Any application of section 2 to the criminal disenfranchisement
statutes would thus exceed congressional authority under the Four-
teenth Amendment and thereby render the Act incongruent and dis-
proportional to the injury it seeks to redress. 352
 Congress would not
be acting to vindicate constitutional rights; the VRA would, in effect,
endow felons with the substantive voting rights that the Constitu-
tion—at least as read by Richardson and its progeny—does not grant
them.353
 The creation of substantive rights—as opposed to enforcing
existing rights—is precisely what the congruence and proportional
proportional representation. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30-31, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 207-09.
346 S. REP. No. 97-417, at 36, as repainted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177, 214.
547 Id. at 38.
345 See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
349
 See supra notes 163-94 and accompanying text. Of course the VRA operates generally
to enforce individual's antidiscrimination rights. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5, as reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177, 181-82. The argument presented here, however, is that the 1982
Amendment to section 2—namely, its relaxation of the intent requirement—specifically
operates solely to enforce individuals' substantive, fundamental voting rights grounded in
the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 28, 36, 37.
359 See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28, 36, 37, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177, 205-06,
214, 215 (recognizing that any voting requirement that denies minorities equal opportu-
nity to participate or elect representatives of their choosing constitutes a violation of the
amended section 2).
351
 See supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
352 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1997).
353 See a
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test seeks to prevent.354 As applied to felony disenfranchisement, sec-
tion 2 of the VRA is therefore unconstitutional. 355
At the most base level, the VRA claims fail because they neglect to
address head-on the legacy of Richardson, which effectively deprives
felons of a fundamental, individual right to vote. 356 So long as depriv-
ing felons of voting rights does not touch on individuals' fundamen-
tal, constitutional rights, states will remain free to deny felons access
to franchise,, and congressional action or private litigation will prove
ineffectual, 357
 If, however, challenges focus on individual rights and
place the burden of justifying these statutes on the states enacting
them, success seems likely given the tenuous policy support for the
practice. 358
 Litigants challenging felony disenfranchisement provi-
sions should therefore consider shifting their focus and strategy to-
wards challenges that implicate fundamental rights.359
CONCLUSION
'Disenfranchising felons is an anachronistic policy whose time has
come. As a punitive measure, it undermines efforts at rehabilitation
554 See id.
355
 See supra notes 318-54 and accompanying text. The siren-sounding proclamation
that such a finding would lead to the "dismantling of the most important piece of civil
rights litigation since Reconstruction" seems overblown. See Farralthan III, 359 F.3d at 1117
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The Act's severability provision
would ensure the continued vitality of the rest of the Act. See Pub. L. No. 94-73 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
355 See supra notes 318-54 and accompanying text.
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355 See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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 Arguments of this sort, which directly challenge the legacy of Richardson, have been
suggested elsewhere. For example, a few commentators have suggested that the Fifteenth
Amendment may have invalidated the "other crime" exception within Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chin, supra note 58, at 259-61; Ewald, supra note 14, at 1131;
Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1291; Shapiro, supra note 111, at 565 n.149. Another scholar has
persuasively argued that because Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment only covers
men, it may have been superseded by the Nineteenth Amendment. See Cosgrove, supra
note 110, at 189-91; see also Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94,98 n.9 (2t1 Cir. 1971) (Tit is
quite natural for Section 2 to limit its reduction formula to the disenfranchisement of
adult males."). Additionally, if a political party were to open unilaterally its primary to fel-
ons, a state's disfranchisement provision may substantially burden that party's First
Amendment associational rights, thereby requiring the state to put forth a compelling
purpose for its praCtice. See Ca. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,581-82 (2000).
Even if the burden on a party's associational rights is not "severe," a state still must articu-
late a valid regulatory purpose for its action. See Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029,2039
(2005). It is questionable that a state could meet even this lesser burden given the suspect
justifications that exist for the practice. See sUpra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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and serves no legitimate punitive rationale. As a regulatory measure,
the practice serves to retard—if not outright defy—our progressive,
national commitment toward a more inclusive and representative
democracy. The practice's disparate impact on minority communities
renders the practice not only politically unwise, but morally deplor-
able, evoking the historical blight of open state hostility towards mi-
nority political empowerment.
As a legal issue, however, states will likely retain their authority to
disenfranchise felons unless and until a challenge successfully incorpo-
rates an individual, fundamental rights-based challenge to trigger the
application of strict scrutiny to the practice. The current challenge to
criminal disenfranchisement laws under the Voting Rights Act—resting
solely on felons' antidiscrimination rights and not on any fundamental,
substantive rights—fails to advance this line of argument and thereby
not only fails in its mission to eliminate felony disenfranchisement laws,
but jeopardizes the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act itself. Liti-
gants should instead explore alternative routes to challenge the prac-
tice in ways that incorporate substantive, fundamental rights-based ar-
guments.
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